When people fumish their goal intentions (U! intend to attain the goal xl") with implementation intentions ( 
Metacognition in Action
Following the aneient Chinese philosopher and general Sun Tsu (ca. 500 B.C.l1996), there are three levels of thinking about action. The first and highest level is strategy, which is meant to define desired end states and set goals. The second and medium level is operative planning, where a person decides on when, where, and how one will engage in goal-directed behaviors. The third and lowest level is tactics, which is the execution of goal-directed behaviors. The decision about which tactics to take depends on the operative planning. Assuming that a person has made the right goal decision and engaged in appropriate operative planning, which in turn leads to effective tactics, Sun Tsu considered goal attainment guaranteed.
Whereas most approaches on metacognition address the question of metacognitive monitoring and control of memory and judgment (Bjork, 1994; Koriat, 1994; Metcalfe, 1993) , in this article we focus on metacognition in action. More specifically, we compare two metacognitive tools ofaction control: (a) goal intentions that are located on the metalevel of strategy, and (b) implementation intentions that operate on the subordinate metalevel of planning. It is suggested that planning the when, where, and how ofinitiating goal-directed behaviors furthers goal attainment. The beneficial effects of such planning are expected to operate via automatie Requests for reprints should be sent to Peter M. Gollwitzer, Universität Konstanz, Postfach 5560, D-78434 Konstanz, Germany. E-mail: Gollwitz@soz.psychologie.uni-konstanz.de.
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processes. When the person encounters the anticipated opportunity, the intended goal-directed action is initiated immediately, efficiently, and without conscious intent (Gollwitzer, 1993) . Moreover, the opportunity and means specified in such plans are detected effectively, attended to spontaneously, and easily accessed in memory. All of these observations (see also Gollwitzer, 1996) suggest that action initiation is no longer consciously and effortfully controlled but has been placed under the direct control of the specified environmental cues. We therefore speak of strategie automaticity when a conscious act of will delegates the control of one's actions to anticipated inner or external events ("When I encounter x, I will perform behavior y!"). We call such acts of will implementation intentions to highlight that we are dealing with action control at the levels of operative planning and execution of tactics. We refer to decisions about goals (level of strategy) as goal intentions ("I want to achieve z!"). In line with Sun Tsu (ca. 500 B.C.l1996), we believe that implementation intentions are formed in the service of goal intentions. Assuming that people have chosen reasonable goals and furnished them with appropriate implementation intentions, the chanees of goal attainment are enhanced (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997) .
In line with Nelson' s (1996) model of metacognition that knows an object level and superimposed metalevels, we consider reflecting on the desirability and feasibility of one's wishes as a component of metacognitive monitoring of the preliminaries of actual behaving on the object level of tactics. Setting goals (goal intentions) and furnishing them with plans (implemen-
